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Introduction. We described an outbreak of C. difficile that 
occurred in the Internal Medicine department of an Italian hospi-
tal and assessed the efficacy of the measures adopted to manage 
the outbreak.
Methods. The outbreak involved 15 patients and was identified 
by means of continuous integrated microbiological surveillance, 
starting with laboratory data (alert organism surveillance).  Diar-
rheal fecal samples from patients with suspected infection by C. 
difficile underwent rapid membrane immuno-enzymatic testing, 
which detects both the presence of the glutamate dehydrogenase 
antigen and the presence of the A and B toxins. Extensive micro-
biological sampling was carried out both before and after sanita-
tion of the environment, in order to assess the efficacy of the sani-
tation procedure.
Results. The outbreak lasted one and a half month, during 
which time the Committee for the Prevention of Hospital Infec-
tions ordered the implementation of multiple interventions, which 
enabled the outbreak to be controlled and the occurrence of 
new cases to be progressively prevented. The strategies adopted 
mainly involved patient isolation, reinforcement of proper hand 
hygiene techniques, antimicrobial stewardship and environmental 
decontamination by means of chlorine-based products. Moreover, 
the multifaceted management of the outbreak involved numerous 
sessions of instruction/training for nursing staff and socio-san-
itary operatives during the outbreak.  Sampling of environmen-
tal surfaces enabled two sites contaminated by C. difficile to be 
identified.
Conclusions. Joint planning of multiple infection control prac-
tices, together with effective communication and collaboration 
between the Hospital Infections Committee and the ward involved 
proved to be successful in controlling the outbreak. 
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Introduction
C. difficile is a Gram-positive anaerobic bacterium. Its 
vegetative cells are capable of forming spores, which 
confer resistance to heating, drying and chemical agents, 
including disinfectants. The pathogenic strains of C. dif-
ficile produce large exotoxin proteins, toxin A (TcdA) 
and toxin B (TcdB), which constitute the principal viru-
lence factors of the microorganism [1, 2]. 
Disease caused by C. difficile can range in severity from 
mild diarrhea to fulminant pseudomembranous colitis 
and, without suitable treatment, toxic megacolon and 
death [3]. A recent prevalence survey of healthcare-
associated infections (HAI) conducted in 183 hospitals 
determined that C. difficile was the most frequently re-
ported infectious agent, being responsible for 12.1% of 
all HAI [4, 5].
Clostridium difficile has increased in prevalence since 
2000, and has caused outbreaks of nosocomial diarrhea 
worldwide [6]. The main cause of most outbreaks of 
Clostridium difficile infection is NAP1/BI/027: a more 
virulent ribotype that has been associated with signifi-
cantly higher morbidity and mortality as a result of more 
severe complications [7]. It is characterized by an in vit-
ro overproduction of toxins A and B and by the produc-
tion of binary toxins [2].
The principal risk factor in Clostridium difficile infec-
tion (CDI) is antibiotic use, and antibiotics from almost 
all classes have been associated with infection [7]. Other 
well-described risk factors are: advanced age, extensive 
comorbidity, and prolonged hospital stay leading to 
asymptomatic carriage, recurrent diarrhea, pseudomem-
branous colitis, or death [7-10].
Patients suffering from C. difficile infection shed large 
amounts of spores that are resistant to disinfectants and 
regular cleaning procedures, contaminating their sur-
roundings and the hands of nurses, medical staff and 
others who come into contact with them; hence, contam-
inated environmental surfaces play a major role in the 
transmission of C. difficile in hospitals [11, 12]. 
The mortality associated with CDI is high, particularly 
in older adults with comorbid conditions, severe disease 
and illness caused by the NAP1 strain of C. difficile [13]. 
Mortality is at least 6% within 3 months of diagnosis and 
13% in patients >80 years of age [14].
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The economic impact of CDI on the healthcare system 
is significant, as it doubles the average length of hos-
pitalization and increases the cost of treatment [6, 15]. 
Nosocomial transmission highlights the importance of 
rigorous infection control practices for preventing the 
spread of C. difficile [14, 16]. 
The aims of the present study were to describe an out-
break of C. difficile that occurred from 29 December 
2015 to 15 February 2016 in the Internal Medicine de-
partment of an Italian hospital and to assess the efficacy 
of the measures adopted to manage the outbreak.
Methods
The outbreak occurred in a nationally renowned, highly 
specialized hospital in northern Italy, organized in ac-
cordance with treatment intensity. The facility is com-
posed of separate pavilions with a total of 431 beds. The 
ward directly involved was female internal medicine, 
which has 26 beds.
Hospital infection cases were defined as patients with 
positive toxin assays > 48 hours after hospital admission.
The outbreak, which involved 15 patients from 29 De-
cember 2015 to 15 February 2016, was identified by 
means of continuous integrated microbiological sur-
veillance, starting with laboratory data (alert organism 
surveillance). Following laboratory identification of an 
epidemiologically important microorganism, the dedi-
cated software of the surveillance system automatically 
e-mails the data to all the members of the Hospital In-
fections Committee (made up of members of the hos-
pital’s healthcare administration, physicians, microbi-
ologists, infectious disease specialists, epidemiologists), 
who then implement the interventions deemed neces-
sary, with particular regard to the application of isola-
tion measures. A validated report is simultaneously sent 
through the laboratory information system to the hospi-
tal facility involved.
For patients with a diagnosis of Clostridium difficile, 
information on age, history of hospitalizations, antibi-
otic treatments, duration of hospitalization and outcome 
were collected.
Microbiological analysis 
Diarrheal fecal samples from patients with suspected in-
fection by C. difficile underwent rapid membrane immu-
no-enzymatic testing by means of the TECHLAB C. diff 
Chek Quick Complete® (AlereTM) kit, which detects both 
the presence of the glutamate dehydrogenase (GDH) an-
tigen, as a means of screening for C. difficile, and the 
presence of the A and B toxins.
Environmental investigation
Extensive microbiological sampling was carried out 
both before and after sanitation of the environment, in 
order to assess the efficacy of the sanitation procedure. 
Sampling was carried out at 14 sites of high-frequency 
contact; the sampling points were selected in accord-
ance with the checklist of the CDCs reported in the 
APIC guidelines “Guide to Preventing Clostridium dif-
ficile Infections” [17], which specifies the critical points 
to be examined in the event of an outbreak. Monitoring 
therefore included critical surfaces in proximity to the 
patient’s bed (e.g. personal light switch and call button) 
and other surfaces at high risk of contact with hospital 
personnel (e.g. medicine trolley, light switch, curtains 
between the beds, etc) or patients.
In accordance with the methods of Best et al. [18] and 
Ali et al. [19], specimens were taken by using 25-cm2 
sponge swabs pre-moistened with neutralizing solu-
tion (Medical Wire & Equipment, England). The swabs 
were then placed aseptically into sterile Stomacher bags 
containing 50 ml of Ringer solution (Oxoid) and ho-
mogenized manually by vigorously massaging the bag 
between the fingertips for 1 min. Liquid from the bag 
was passed through a 0.45-mm filter (Millipore), which 
was then placed aseptically onto Brazier’s Clostridium 
difficile selective agar (Oxoid). Plates were then incu-
bated at 37°C under anaerobic conditions for 48 h prior 
to reading.
C. difficile was initially identified on the basis of the 
macroscopic appearance of colonies and microscopic 
characteristics, and confirmed to be C. difficile by means 
of latex agglutination testing (Oxoid C. difficile Test kit).
Results
Description of the outbreak
Following the analysis of patients’ records, a possible 
index case was identified: an 86-year-old woman hospi-
talized on 16 December 2015 in the ward where the out-
break originated. This patient had already been admit-
ted to the same hospital in the previous month (geriatric 
ward) for bronchopneumopathy.
On 12 December she was taken to the Emergency De-
partment with bruising to the pelvis after a fall at home. 
A bilateral pleural effusion and respiratory insufficiency 
were diagnosed. She was therefore hospitalized in the 
Sub-intensive Care Unit and, after being stabilized, was 
transferred to the Internal Medicine Department three 
days later.
Table I reports the characteristics of the patients involved 
in the outbreak. Their mean age was 82.13 years (range 
70-90 years), the mean Charlson index was 7 (range 
4-13) and the mean duration of hospitalization before 
the first isolation of C. difficile was 16 days (range 4-34 
days). With regard to outcome, 5 patients died (4 attrib-
utable to C. difficile), 6 were transferred to other health-
care facilities and/or wards, and 4 were discharged. 
In 86.67% of cases, the C. difficile strain responsible for 
the infection produced both toxin A and toxin B; in the 
remaining cases, weak positivity to the immuno-enzy-
matic test was recorded. The patients were treated with 
metronidazole and, in the event of failure, vancomycin.
Figure 1 describes distribution of Clostridium difficile 
infected patients as a function of time
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Infection control practices during  
the outbreak 
Figure 2 shows the epidemic curve of the outbreak from 
29 December 2015 to 15 February 2016. The timescale 
of the interventions implemented by the Committee for 
the Prevention of Hospital Infections is also indicated. 
From the moment when the first two cases of infection 
were diagnosed an antimicrobial stewardship program 
and the following interventions were implemented:
Intervention 1: from 29 December 2015: 
• Specification of the measures to be taken in order to 
contain risk of infection by Clostridium difficile, con-
sidering all patients to be potentially infected; writ-
ten instructions delivered to all healthcare personnel 
involved.
• Testing for C. difficile toxins in all symptomatic pa-
tients.
• Isolation in cohorts of infected patients; assistance to 
cohorts (dedicated operators); use of dedicated small 
devices (e.g. oximeter, hemoglucotest device, etc) for 
infected patients.
• Ad hoc environmental sanitation for Clostridium dif-
ficile in the entire department (with 20% concentra-
tions of chlorine-based detergent), including decon-
tamination of telephones and computer keyboards 
and screens (ready-to-use sodium hypochlorite solu-
tion). In order to facilitate adequate daily sanitation, 
bedside tables were kept clear of all but indispensa-
ble objects (bottle of water and glass).
• Checking to ensure that healthcare personnel com-
plied with hand hygiene protocols. In addition, the 
hands of all non-self-sufficient patients were washed 
more frequently and self-sufficient patients were in-
structed on how to wash their hands properly.
• Checking to ensure that gloves were used properly 
and were changed after assisting each individual pa-
tient, and that hands were washed immediately after 
the removal of gloves. 
• Operators involved in direct assistance were instruct-
ed to change their overalls daily and were encouraged 
to use microfiber overalls, which are more protective 
of the hygiene of infected patients, and disposable 
nonwoven gowns. 
• Staff were forbidden to use personal mobile phones 
while assisting infected patients.
Tab. I. Characteristics of patients involved in the outbreak
Patient Clostridium difficile toxins Days of hospitalization Age Charlson index Bed Outcome
1* A and B 16 85 7 23 Transferred
2 A and B 11 80 7 24 Transferred
3 A and B 9 70 12 6 Died
4 A and B 27 88 6 5 Died
5 A and B 26 79 4 8 Discharged
6 Weak positivity 13 84 6 9 Discharged
7 A and B 16 75 7 1 Died
8 A and B 12 85 5 10 Discharged
9 A and B 15 90 8 7 Died
10 A and B 4 84 5 1 Discharged
11 A and B 34 80 6 14 Died
12 A and B 16 77 4 23 Transferred
13 Weak positivity 12 80 7 10 Transferred
14 A and B 17 88 6 6 Transferred
15 A and B 12 87 13 26 Transferred
*Suspected index case
Fig. 1. Distribution of Clostridium difficile infected patients as a function of time.
MANAGEMENT OF A CLOSTRIDIUM DIFFICILE OUTBREAK 
E135
• Correct patient hygiene practices were emphasized; 
soiled underwear was placed in an impermeable 
bag labeled with the patient’s name, which was then 
placed in a dedicated container inside the room/cu-
bicle. If a patient lift was used, the sling cover was 
changed for each patient and sent for disinfection as 
if it were certainly infected; the same approach was 
adopted towards minor aids, for which disposable 
protective covers were also used.
• The number of visitors was reduced, and a specific 
information leaflet concerning the behavior of visi-
tors to infected patients was distributed; this provid-
ed instructions on hand washing and interpersonal 
contact.
The day after implementation of intervention 1, anoth-
er two cases of infection were discovered. Following a 
meeting to update and instruct nursing staff and social/
healthcare workers, the second phase of intervention 
was implemented.
Intervention 2: from 30 December 2015: 
• Simulation of donning and removing personal pro-
tection devices (PPD). 
• Reiteration of procedures for the proper sanitation 
of stands for i.v. drips, commode chairs, infusion 
pumps, PCs and telephones.
• Meals served in heat-sealed containers for all pa-
tients.
• Checking of proper isolation of infected patients 
(e.g. collocation of the patient, supply of hand-wash-
ing requisites, availability of disposable overalls, 
materials and dedicated devices, etc.); this revealed 
the need to supply some types of medical devices for 
dedicated use (e.g. stethoscope and sphigmomanom-
eter). 
• Urgent processing of fecal samples for culture tests; 
prompt telephone communication of positive reports 
to the expert consultants of the Committee for the 
Prevention of Hospital Infections, for immediate ap-
plication of the necessary measures.
• Periodic checks on compliance with the measures 
recommended.
Intervention 3: from 5 January 2016
• Ward staff increased on both day shifts and night 
shifts.
Intervention 4: 8 January 2016
• Review of cases following the administration of an-
tibiotic treatment and implementation of the control 
measures; assessment of the need to institute further 
briefings/training for medical and nursing staff.
Intervention 5: from 12 January 2016
• Structural, logistical and organizational segregation 
of infected patients (left side of the ward) from unin-
Fig. 2. Epidemic curve of the C. difficile outbreak and the timescale of the interventions implemented.
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fected patients (right side), and consequent reorgani-
zation of the activities of sanitation and assistance.
• Direct observation to ensure proper implementation 
of the measures to contain the risk of infection, and 
institution of “on the job” staff training with regard 
to: donning and removal of personal protection de-
vices; the hygiene of infected patients, with par-
ticular regard to the hands; decontamination of the 
patient-unit; use of personalized devices for each pa-
tient; decontamination of the environment, materials 
and medical devices; functional isolation of cohorts; 
institution of a differential pathway from “clean” to 
“dirty”; proper collection and conservation of fecal 
samples prior to analysis; application of medication 
to CVC with maintenance of asepsis in infected pa-
tients; healthcare education of visitors, with simula-
tion of hand hygiene.
From this date onwards, thanks to the set of control 
measures adopted, the number of cases of infection pro-
gressively diminished, and the last two cases recorded 
on 8 February 2016 were resolved.
Environmental monitoring
The microbiological results of environmental monitor-
ing conducted on 15 January 2016 revealed contamina-
tion by Clostridium difficile on the curtain separating 
two beds that had been occupied by patients involved 
in the outbreak (beds 23 and 24) and on the call but-
ton of bed 24. The curtain was promptly removed and 
disposed of, and the entire environment was thoroughly 
disinfected. Subsequent monitorings, carried out after 
environmental sanitation, revealed no contamination by 
C. difficile.
Discussion 
Several reports suggest that the incidence and severity of 
C. difficile infection have been increasing in recent years 
across the United States, Canada and Europe. Recent da-
ta from 28 community hospitals in the southern United 
States suggest that C. difficile has replaced methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus as the most common 
cause of healthcare-associated infection [20, 21]. The 
burden of healthcare-associated CDIs in acute-care 
hospitals in the EU/EEA has been estimated at 123,997 
cases annually. In the ECDC point prevalence survey of 
healthcare-associated infections in European acute-care 
hospitals 2011-2012, C. difficile was the 8th most fre-
quently detected microorganism among HAIs [22].
In the present study, we documented the occurrence of 
15 cases of C. difficile infection in an internal medicine 
department in an Italian hospital. During the outbreak 
the Committee for the Prevention of Hospital Infections 
ordered the implementation of multiple interventions, 
which enabled the outbreak to be controlled and the oc-
currence of new cases to be progressively prevented.
The outbreak described in this paper started and finished 
in a single ward, involved a relatively small number of 
patients, and lasted one and a half month. Wong-Mc-
Clure et al. [23] described an outbreak due to C. difficile 
that involved three wards and 389 patients, and which 
lasted for several months. More recently, van Beurden et 
al. [6] described an outbreak that involved 19 wards and 
72 patients, and which lasted for a year.
As pointed out by several studies, there may not be a 
single method that is effective in minimizing exposure 
to C. difficile, and a multifaceted approach is usually re-
quired [24]. Indeed, the management of CDI in hospitals 
requires just such a multidisciplinary approach, which 
begins with infection prevention. A previous study by 
Weiss et al. [25] showed that a multi-pronged interven-
tion strategy is most effective in reducing the rate of 
healthcare CDI. 
Strategies for the prevention and control of C. difficile 
infections are aimed at promptly identifying, isolating 
and efficaciously treating patients affected by CDI (in 
order to reduce the dissemination of spores and prevent 
secondary cases) and at minimizing preventable risk 
factors through the implementation of protocols of be-
havior, environmental sanitation and antibiotic steward-
ship [26].
In accordance with this approach, the strategies adopted 
for the control of the Clostridium difficile outbreak de-
scribed here mainly involved patient isolation, reinforce-
ment of proper hand hygiene techniques, antimicrobial 
stewardship and environmental decontamination by 
means of chlorine-based products. 
Indeed, the presence of other patients with infection, 
hand carriage on the part of healthcare personnel and 
contaminated environmental surfaces are considered to 
be major factors in the transmission of pathogens in hos-
pitals [27-29], including C. difficile.
When there is an infected patient in hospital, the hospi-
tal environment is contaminated by spores within a few 
hours of the onset of diarrhea; other patients may there-
fore be infected and the patient himself/herself may be 
reinfected. Moreover, C. difficile spores are highly re-
sistant to many commonly used disinfectants and may 
persist for months in hospital environments [30].
Environmental contamination with C. difficile spores 
occurs at as many as 34-58% of sites, despite cleaning, 
with surfaces of fomites being most frequently contami-
nated [18].
Frequenly touched surfaces in near patient areas are rap-
idly contaminated by the microorganisms disseminated 
by the infected patient occupying the room, and may 
remain contaminated for extended periods of time [31]. 
Consequently, C. difficile can be found on hospital 
floors, on bedrails, windowsills, commodes, toilets, call 
buttons, blood pressure cuffs, electronic thermometers, 
bedsheets and anything that comes into contact with 
contaminated hands [32]. Thus, thorough disinfection 
of the contaminated hospital environment is essential 
in order to prevent the transmission of this nosocomial 
pathogen, and the choice of hospital decontamination 
protocols can markedly affect the prevalence and envi-
ronmental distribution of C. difficile contamination [33]. 
The scientific evidence supports the use of detergents 
containing chlorine (at least 1000 ppm of active chlo-
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rine) in endemic situations or during epidemic out-
breaks [1]. A study by Fawley et al. [33] compared the 
efficacy of five different cleaning agents against epidem-
ic and non-epidemic C. difficile strains. They found that 
only chlorine-based germicides were able to inactivate 
C. difficile spores. 
Contamination of the hands of healthcare staff and pa-
tients with C. difficile is a major route of transmission 
of the infection, and there is a close correlation between 
hand contamination and the degree of environmental 
contamination. For this reason, proper hand hygiene is 
crucial to preventing the transmission of C. difficile in 
the hospital setting [32]. 
During the outbreak described in this paper, various in-
terventions were undertaken in order to ensure adher-
ence to hand hygiene protocols on the part of healthcare 
staff and patients; those visiting infected patients were 
also taught to wash their hands and to limit contact only 
to the patient being visited. Indeed, checking the staff’s 
compliance with hand hygiene has been deemed a more 
effective strategy than microbiological testing of the 
hands by means of sampling. 
A recommendation common to many guidelines on the 
prevention and control of healthcare-related infections 
concerns the training of healthcare personnel, visitors, 
caregivers and patients themselves. The multifaceted 
management of the outbreak described here involved nu-
merous sessions of instruction/training for nursing staff 
and socio-sanitary operatives during the course of the 
epidemic. By modifying risk behaviors, these interven-
tions certainly helped to control the outbreak.
Equally important was environmental monitoring. Lim-
ited to times of outbreak, rather than being part of rou-
tine practice, this can provide a valuable estimate of the 
level of contamination on surfaces such as walls, work 
surfaces, floors and equipment [34] and is currently 
recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention [35]. In the present case, sampling of envi-
ronmental surfaces enabled two sites contaminated by 
C. difficile to be identified, one of which was a soft 
plastic-coated curtain separating two beds that had pre-
viously been occupied by infected patients. As this cur-
tain would have been very difficult to disinfect, it was 
removed and disposed of immediately after the detection 
of contamination; this measure may well have enabled 
an environmental reservoir of the microorganism to be 
eliminated, a hypothesis that is also supported by the 
trend in the epidemic curve after the implementation of 
environmental monitoring.
In conclusion, joint planning of multiple infection con-
trol practices, together with effective communication 
and collaboration between the Hospital Infections Com-
mittee and the ward involved proved to be successful in 
controlling the outbreak.
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